Abstract: Collective management of copyright on musical works and audio-video products in China had a late start in relation to the global pace. There are currently five collective management organisations (CMOs) in China, with the Musical Copyright Society of China for musical works and the China Audio-Video Copyright Association for audio-video products being the most dominant. This paper identifies three problems in the institutional design of copyright collective management in China: vague standards for jurisdiction, weak regulation of the CMO monopoly, and the quasi-official status of CMOs. It also discusses three controversies in relation to these collective management practices: the controversial standard setting of licensing fees, the lack of transparency in the distribution of licensing fees, and difficulties that CMOs face when undergoing litigation processes. The paper argues that these controversies can be better managed by establishing regulations on abuse of monopoly power by CMOs, the proper use of their quasi-official status, and an improvement in judicial techniques and transparency in governance.
Introduction
Collective management organisations (CMOs) was originated in France in the 18th century. The first CMO in the world, the Society of Dramatic Authors and Composers (SACD), was established by a group of 22 authors to resist the all-powerful actors of the French Theatre in 1777. 1 Later, CMOs were established in many European countries to facilitate the management of rights that are otherwise difficult to be exercised by individual copyright holders. In practice, owing to the differences in legal frameworks of various jurisdictions and across the fields that CMOs operate in, CMOs vary widely and are often not easily comparable (Wu and Rui, 2007) . Notwithstanding this discrepancy, their functions remain the same: first, reducing transaction costs implicit in process of identifying copyright holders, information exchanging and negotiating separate licensing contracts, and regulatory costs; second, balancing the negotiation power of right holders and users (Fujitani, 1984) .
Copyright legislation started fairly late in China in relation to western nations. Not until 1990s was the first copyright law in China, Copyright Law (1990) , 2 promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC). 3 In Copyright Law (1990), there were no provisions mentioning the collective management of copyright. However, in Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Law (1991) 4 formulated by the State Council, 5 Article 54 states collective management to be one of the ways in which copyright can be exercised, while Article 7.3 mentions the approval of the establishment of a CMO as one of the mandates of the National Copyright Administration (NCA). Based on these regulations, the first CMO in China, Musical Copyright Society of China (MCSC), was established in 1992. It continued to be the only copyright CMO in China until 2005 .
There are two main reasons for MCSC to be the only CMO in China for over 13 years. Firstly, since the concept of copyright in China was still in its infancy in the 1990s, collective management as a mechanism for facilitating the collection of licensing fees was not as necessary as it would be in a fully developed copyright system. Secondly, in China the legal hierarchy of administrative regulations is subsidiary to that of legislations, and issues addressed by administrative regulations are not high on the agenda of the country's overall development. Since copyright collective management is only stipulated generally in administrative regulations [Implementing Regulations of the 4 participate in litigation or arbitration involving the authorised copyright or related rights (Article 2).
Copyright and related rights authorised to CMOs are those that may be difficult to be enforced by right holders themselves, including the following: right of reproduction, right of performance, right of projection, right of broadcasting, right of renting and right of communication via information networks (Article 4). From a legal perspective, the CMO-right holder dynamics are generally considered as a trust. In China, most academics agree that the management of copyright and related rights by CMOs is based on a trust, with right holders giving over this trust, CMOs acting as their trustees, and musical works or audio-video products being the trusted property. In such a relationship, a right holder entrusts his/her copyright on musical works or related rights on audio-video products to a CMO, and the CMO then manages these rights (including management actions such as registering works or audio-video products, concluding licensing agreements with users and initiating litigation upon infringement, etc.) in its own name in accordance with the intentions of the right holder and for the benefit of the beneficiary (i.e., the right holder) (Liu, 2006; Liu, 2007; Wang, 2010; Jiang and Gervais, 2012) . Such a legal relationship is governed by Copyright Law and attendant regulations, as well as the Trust Law (2001) of China. 9 Chinese literature on CMOs focused on various challenges and issues arising from the establishment of CMOs in the early 1990s. The issues discussed in this early stage typically relate to the experiences of other countries, their lessons learned and implications for China (Jia, 1997) , as well as the necessity for China to establish a collective management mechanism (Xu, 1996) . Later, following the first amendment in Copyright Law (2001) and the formulation of the Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) , the scholarship tended to concentrate on the infrastructure of the collective management mechanism (Wei, 1999) . The third wave of academic discussion on Chinese CMOs was triggered by the proposal for an extended collective management mechanism (extending the management scope of CMOs to non-members' works in certain circumstances) in the third amendment of Copyright Law (Hu, 2013) . Since the third amendment of Copyright Law is in process, the question of whether or not to adopt an extended collective management mechanism is still pending.
To a lesser extent, academic literature beyond the Chinese scholarship has also dedicated some attention to the collective management of copyright in China. For example, Jiang and Gervais (2012) provide an overview of copyright collective management in China by identifying three prominent problems of CMOs: the relationship between CMOs and their members, especially CMOs' standing to sue; the relationship between CMOs and non-members; the abuse of the monopolistic position by Chinese CMOs. Wang (2010) further analysed the tense relationship between CMOs and non-members, and associated it with the current discussion of establishing a mechanism of extended licensing in the third amendment of Copyright Law. This paper will focus on the practice of collective management of copyright on musical works (provided by the MCSC) and related rights on audio-video products (provided by CAVCA) in China. Given their comparatively long history and the popularity of fields they operate in, CAVCA and MCSC can be regarded as the most active and dominant CMOs in China (Jiang and Gervais, 2012) . Besides MCSC and CAVCA, other CMOs in China (such as the China Written Works Copyright Society and China Film Copyright Association) have also undergone rapid development recently, particularly owing to the absorption of many new members (Tang, 2014) . However, they are relatively immature compared with MCSC and CAVCA, and many of their practices follow those of CAVCA's and MCSC's. 10 In addition, some of the problems they have encountered are also similar to those of CAVCA and MCSC, the latter can thus be regarded as setting precedents for other CMOs.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of CMOs managing copyright and related rights in China, as well as their problems 11 and challenges. This paper identifies three problems in the institutional design of CMOs: vague demarcation of jurisdictions among different CMOs, weak regulation of the CMO monopoly, and the quasi-official status of CMOs. These problems in the institutional design further lead to controversial practices among these CMOs, including disputes in the standard setting of licensing fees, a lack of transparency in the distribution of licensing fees, and difficulties for CMOs in litigation. This paper argues that most of these controversies (despite those regarding litigation to be addressed by improvements in judicial techniques) could be better managed by stricter regulations on the abuse of monopoly power by CMOs, the proper use of their quasi-official status, and improved transparency in their governance.
Section two briefly introduces the current situation of collective management of copyright on musical works and related rights on audio-video products in China; section three discusses the problems arising from the institutional design of the copyright collective management mechanism; section four analyses some of the CMOs' major controversial practices; section five recommends possible ways to solve existing problems; section six concludes.
Current CMOs on musical works and audio-video products in China

Well-developed CMO on musical works
As mentioned, MCSC was the first CMO established in China, and its practices subsequently set examples for the collective management of other types of works. MCSC has relatively comprehensive institutions and licensing arrangements to support its business all over China. It has nine departments, over 50 employees with expertise on law, music, marketing, information technology, etc., and over 20 branches in economically advanced cities. It is entitled to offer copyright licensing on the mechanical reproduction of musical works under its management, such as publishing audio-video products, producing computer karaoke machines, hosting live performances, playing background music at public places including restaurants, bars, hotels, Karaoke Television (KTV) rooms, aircraft cabins and train compartments, broadcasting by radio and television studios, and using musical works via information networks. It also incorporated the musical works of Chinese residents into the international identification system by channelling information relating to names and works respectively to interested party information (IPI) and ISWC. 15 This incorporation is crucial for Chinese right holders because once the works of Chinese residents are used overseas, their copyright can also promptly be protected in the place they are used. 16 By the end of 2012, MCSC had over 7,000 members and managed over 14 million musical works (including those covered by reciprocal agreements), collecting licensing fees worth over RMB110 million (approximately USD17.5 million 17 ). 18 In 2013, licensing fees collected by MCSC reached RMB112 million (approximately USD 18.37 million 19 ), of which 82.23% were distributed to copyright holders. Licensing fees for different types of copyright managed by MCSC are illustrated in the following chart (Xin, 2014) . 
Relatively young but fast growing CMO on audio-video products
The hasty establishment of the CAVCA was largely a response to the chaotic karaoke market. Founded on 28th May 2008, CAVCA was incorporated by the China Audio-Video Association and later approved and announced by NCA. 20 It is exclusively devoted to managing related rights on audio-video products and programs. In 2006, two years prior to its formal establishment, the association had started collecting licensing fees from karaoke operators under the name of the 'China Audio-Video Association and CAVCA (preparatory committee) ' 21 upon approval by the NCA. The NCA had allowed this practice on a rather rushed basis because the use of audio-video products at KTVs without licensing was rampant at the time, which gave rise to significant discontent among recording companies.
At present, CAVCA's core business is the operation of karaoke machine programs and the licensing of materials used therein. In addition to licensing karaoke operators to use its managed audio-video products and programs, the organisation also promotes the licensing of audio-video products and programs over the Internet and of those used with computer karaoke machines, mobile TVs and at exhibitions. 25 By doing so, CAVCA was enabled to license to karaoke operators well-made copyrighted tracks, providing them with the CAVCA logo, retrieving code and legitimate content. 26 Open to the continual addition of new ones, this pool includes over 90,000 copyrighted karaoke tracks. The first batch of over 20,000 karaoke tracks has been issued since 24th February 2014 (CAVCA, 2014).
Problems in the institutional design of copyright CMOs in China
Vague standards for the demarcation of jurisdictions of different CMOs
The stipulations in China's Copyright Law on collective management are very general. They only confirm collective management as a way of exercising copyright and define the not-for-profit nature of CMOs and their main mandates, without including specific details for the standards they are to adhere to in terms of the demarcation of the jurisdiction of different CMOs. Looking further at Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004), no clear stipulations on such issues can be found except in Article 7.2, which requires 'no overlap of mandates for a proposed CMO with already legitimately registered CMOs' as one of the conditions for establishing a new CMO. The mentioned provision implies that the type of works or rights under the management of a new CMO will not overlap with the already established CMOs. This lack of clear and detailed guidance in the legislation further leads to mixed standards for the demarcation of jurisdiction in practice.
It seems that China has adopted 'type of works' as a standard for demarcating the jurisdiction among different CMOs, throughout the gradual establishment of the China Written Works Copyright Society, the Images Copyright Society of China, and the China Film Copyright Association (collective). However, the same logic is not followed for other types of works, typically in the cases of MCSC and CAVCA, where the scope of their management is demarcated by 'type of right', i.e., copyright on musical works and related rights on audio-video products. Even when following this standard of demarcating jurisdictions by type of right, confusion still exists. On the one hand, gaps in jurisdictions exist between CAVCA and MCSC where neither one manages related rights of performers nor broadcasting organisations, so the related rights under collective management are not adequately comprehensive. On the other hand, even though Copyright Law only entitles audio-video producers related rights such as the rights of reproduction, distribution, renting and communication via information networks, CAVCA has nonetheless overstepped this boundary by managing some types of copyright only entitled to authors (composers and lyricists) of musical works. In its charter, CAVCA lists certain type of copyright of authors under its management (e.g., the right of performance, projection and broadcasting of audio-video products). Due to this overlap in jurisdictions, conflict around double charging users between CAVCA and MCSC is inevitable.
This lack of clarity in demarcating jurisdictions of different CMOs is intrinsically linked to the policy making process in China, where legislation often follows the established institutional framework, not the opposite. For instance, the State Patent Office of China was established in 1979, but Patent Law was promulgated only in 1984. The same is true in the case of CMOs. MCSC, established long before the promulgation of Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) in 1992, had already defined its jurisdiction before the overarching institutional design was actually put in place. This issue is also related to the quasi-official status 27 of CMOs in China: their establishment and operation are highly influenced by the governing authority (NCA). A solution to the double charging conflict, therefore, is only feasible following the intervention of the NCA.
From an economic perspective, musical works authors (composers and lyricists), performers, audio-video works producers, broadcasting organisations and users are stakeholders at different stages in the value chain of musical works or audio-video products, and parties except the end users are all entitled certain types of copyright or related rights. The challenge with audio-video products is that though directly guaranteed only related rights to audio-video producers, the generation of such products involves other parties of the value chain and these parties are also entitled to certain types of copyright or related rights.
Recognising these underlying issues of double charging problem, Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) provide a solution to the problem. Article 26 of the Regulations provides that "in the case two or more CMOs collect licensing fees for the same usage and from the same user, these CMOs should first consult with each other to decide which of the organisations will collect licensing fees. After licensing fees are collected, part of the fees shall be distributed to the other organisations involved through further consultation".
In practice, the problem of potential double charging of karaoke operators caused by overlaps in CMOs' jurisdiction has been solved by mutual consultation of CAVCA and MCSC, following the intervention of the NCA. Eventually, MCSC authorises CAVCA to collect licensing fees for musical works, and CAVCA later transfers a certain percentage of these fees to MCSC after deducting management fees. Through such distribution scheme, MCSC obtains 40% of the fees for authors of musical works and can subsequently redistribute them to lyricists and composers, while CAVCA receives 60% and can then redistribute them to recording companies.
Weak regulation of the CMO monopoly
There are two globally recognised models of CMOs in terms of competition: monopolistic and non-monopolistic. Monopolistic CMOs receive a statutory monopolistic status to license specific type(s) of rights/works, which no other organisation can thereafter have jurisdiction over. For instance, most European countries including Belgium, France, Germany (except the audio-visual sector), Greece, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden have adopted this monopolistic approach. In the non-monopolistic approach, the coexistence of homogeneous CMOs (CMOs managing the same type of rights/works) is allowed, and competition among them is encouraged. Typical cases of non-monopolistic CMOs are those found in the USA and Canada (Liu, 2012) .
CMOs in China are monopolistic for certain types of works/rights. Although the term 'monopoly' does not explicitly appear in their legal provisions, the CMO monopoly is guaranteed by law. Article 7 in the Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) states that: 'Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organisations entitled copyright or rights related to copyright according to law may sponsor the establishment of a CMO'. It further stipulates specific requirements for the establishment of a CMO in China. 28 In theory, given the legal requirement for the non-overlapping jurisdiction of a new CMO with existing CMOs, there can be only one CMO in operation in a specific field. As discussion has indicated, in practice these overlaps inevitably do occur; however, this has been solved by a redistribution scheme of licensing fees among themselves with the intervention of the NCA.
The territorial scope of the relevant market of a CMO monopoly in China has been defined as nationwide based on the requirement of Regulations of Copyright Collective Management (2004) that a CMO in China has to be nationally representative. In practice, while MCSC and CAVCA cannot meet the predetermined nationally representative requirement, their statutory monopolistic status has closed the door for grassroots CMOs to bridge this gap. This lack of real nationwide representativeness has created a dilemma: on the one hand, the existence of a large number of non-members may undermine the credibility of MCSC and CAVCA; on the other, MCSC and CAVCA may be sued by non-members if they license members' and non-members' works or audio-video products in a lump-sum way to users (Yang, 2006) . 29 To solve this predicament, MCSC and CAVCA have reinforced their promotion of the advantages of collective management and initiated large scale infringement lawsuits to attract more non-member right holders to join their clubs. For instance, less than six months after establishment, CAVCA sued 100 KTVs in Beijing for copyright infringement on 17th October 2008 (Sui, 2008) . This was later compounded by the fact that CMOs were quite active in proposing extended collective management mechanisms to be able to represent rights of non-members during the third amendment of the Copyright Law (Hu, 2013) .
The monopolistic status of CMOs in China was further consolidated by the requirement that the establishment of a CMO has to be approved by the NCA [Article 9 in the Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004)]. Therefore, other organisations or individuals cannot undertake copyright collective management related activities. One typical case challenging Article 9 is the 'converted' copyright collective management of Yindeli.
In 2005, during the preparation for the establishment of CAVCA, Beijing Yindeli International Musical Cultural Ltd. (Yindeli) started collecting licensing fees from karaoke operators in Nanjing after it was authorised by some international recording companies. Informed of Yindeli's activities, the NCA issued a Notice that stated this practice to be 'a converted form of copyright collective management', and would 'cause confusion to the legitimate way of using musical works, have a severe impact on the copyright collective management regime in China, and seriously disrupt the market order'. The NCA also instructed the local copyright administration, Jiangsu Copyright Administration, to investigate the case. 30 Following this intervention and subsequent investigation, Yindeli abstained from its business of 'converted' collective management without any explicit reasoning.
Given there is no clear standard to distinguish the activity of copyright agency and collective management, the monopolistic status of CMOs may potentially usurp the copyright agencies' remit. The main issue in dispute in the Yindeli case is the nature of the legal relationship between a right holder and a CMO: is this a formal contractual relationship of agency or one of trust? Though it is generally agreed in China that the legal relationship between a right holder and a CMO is trust, there has also been some disagreement on this argument. Zhai (2003) , while agreeing that in most cases the relationship between a right holder and a CMO is one of trust, also emphasises that a formal contractual relationship between the two historically existed to enable the management of 'non-trivial rights', such as opera or drama. While there is no official interpretation of this relationship, the case of Yindeli may reflect the NCA's opinion on such type of practice, i.e., the legal nature of the relationship between a CMO and a right holder is different from that in a contractual relationship of agency. However, in practice copyright collective management could only distinguish itself from an agency contract of copyright in terms of its necessity for official approval from the NCA and its fulfilment of the criteria of being a not-for-profit organisation. According to Chinese laws and regulations, it is not necessary to obtain this approval in the case of an agency contract of copyright, and the agent is profit oriented. Other aspects of copyright collective management and an agency contract of copyright are almost the same, such as the need to seek authorisation from right holders, conclude licensing contracts with users, collect licensing fees from users on behalf of right holders, and distribute these licensing fees to the right holders. Without clear provisions on the elements of illegal collective management, the similarities of CMOs and copyright agency have caused confusion in practice and may ultimately have contributed to expanding the monopolistic power of CMOs to the practice of a copyright agency.
While the monopolistic status of CMOs in China is guaranteed by law, it is not properly regulated. Article 20 of Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) stipulates that the right holder's authorisation to a CMO shall be exclusive -in the period of their mutual contract of collective management, a CMO has the exclusive right to enforce the authorised rights. 31 Such a requirement excludes even right holders themselves from enforcing their own copyright or related rights. It is based on the logic of trust and intended to guarantee the efficiency of collective management, as well as protect the reputation of CMOs and the interests of right holders as a whole. Otherwise, if right holders can bypass a CMO and enforce their own rights, users may suspect the validity of the authorisation. However, the legitimacy of this exclusive authorisation requirement is questionable because it precludes the private autonomy of right holders. In practice, it is not uncommon for right holders to breach this exclusive authorisation agreement and enforce their own rights by initiating a lawsuit ). This requirement is also questionable because it is not consistent with a reply of the Supreme People's Court, 32 which acknowledged the right of authors of musical works to initiate a lawsuit when the authorised right is under infringement but MCSC itself fails to initiate legal action, or when the right holder considers it necessary, among other reasons.
CAVCA was also suspected as a price monopoly. In 2008, there was a complaint submitted to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce by Mr. Zhengwei Dong against CAVCA for its price monopoly (Zhang and Wan, 2008) . It could be a good opportunity for regulatory entities on monopoly to scrutinise the scheme of price setting of CAVCA's licensing fees (approved by NCA), including the fairness of methods for calculation and the price setting procedure. However, the case was further commissioned by NDRC to Beijing Municipal Development and Reform Commission and the latter confirmed the legality of price setting by CAVCA by deciding that CAVCA's practice did not constitute an abuse of monopoly power (Lai, 2009 ).
Quasi-official status of CMOs due to underdeveloped civil society
While the quasi-official status of CMOs is related to their monopolistic position, it is still a different issue. In China, 'quasi-official status' is a position of most social organisations which is between official/public and private because social organisations are often established by or affiliated to governmental agencies. As mentioned, the monopolistic position of CMOs is granted by Copyright Law and related regulations, but the law does not specify who or what organisations exactly will comprise the monopoly -it could be a private company. However, Article 7 of the Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) stipulates one condition for establishing a CMO that it (the CMO to be established) is capable of 'representing the interests of right holders all over China'. Given that China is a country with a huge territory, varied levels of development in different regions, and a tradition of a planned economy, it is impossible for any private organisation to get authorisation all over China at the pace they would need to meet the Regulations' requirement to establish a CMO.
In practice, the CMOs in China have been founded via a 'top-down' approach instigated by certain artists' or industrial associations 33 that were then approved and supported by the governing authority (NCA). The effect of such approach is that the NCA is closely involved in CMOs' managerial decisions, 34 and right holders are unaware of any active association with CMOs and their rights authorised. This differs from the 'bottom-up' approach through which most CMOs have been established by right holders in Western countries in a form of autonomous social organisation since the 18th century onwards (Xiong, 2013) .
Ultimately, CMOs' top-down approach is intrinsically linked to the challenge of China's underdeveloped civil society. Their quasi-official background means that CMOs in China have direct input from the NCA, the country's chief regulating body on copyright, especially with regard to personnel appointments and dismissals (Ye, 2012) . 35 In theory, therefore, CMOs could use their 'Guanxi' 36 with governing authorities to solve disputes with users and right holders in the market, which would then preclude the other parties from receiving appropriate remedies in a dispute and ultimately conceal problems in the practice of CMOs. For example, the case of Yindeli in Section 3.2 was solved by administrative measures (a notice from the NCA), and Yindeli was deprived of the opportunity to defend itself in court.
Nonetheless, the quasi-official background of CMOs in China also has its benefits, primarily because their development can be greatly accelerated in their early stages. It is difficult to imagine how MSCS could have been established before a specific legal basis was set without supports from the NCA, how CAVCA could start collecting licensing fees at its preparation stage, and how CAVCA's appeals against a third party for copyright infringement could be generally supported by courts in different regions.
As quasi-official organisations, CMOs sometimes confuse their role with that of an administrative body or public entity, i.e., the role of the CMO is not to facilitate market transactions but to administrate market order (Lu, 2007) . 37 This market right to collect copyright licensing fees is ultimately confused with any other charges implemented by an administrative entity. In practice, users are denied their right to participate in price setting and this further caused a tense relationship between CMOs and their users. There have been large scale protests by users refusing to play background music on business premises on the basis of 'unreasonable charging'. 38 The statutory charging standard also suffers from a lack of flexibility. For example, the price setting for karaoke operators used to be based on a standard set in an NCA notice, 39 which did not change between 2009 and 2014. Key inferences from these regulations is that the standard setting for licensing fees is a unilateral right of CMOs, and that there is no space left for users to participate in negotiations and mutually set the price range. As mentioned in Section 3.2, CMOs have exclusive rights guaranteed by the law. In practice, users have no other choice but to challenge the specific charging standards set by the MCSC and CAVCA. MCSC has set the standards for licensing fees on the basis of different types of copyright, such as right of reproduction, performance, broadcasting, and transmission via information networks. Within each standard, different methods of calculation are used to establish the specific price, including royalties, the quantity of products, time duration or area of space of performance. These methods are tailored to the specific usage of the musical works, form of carrier, quantity of works under the licence, time and place of use, or number of people in the audience, following which a baseline fee for each musical work is provided (see Appendix 1).
While these standards seem detailed, they are not set through negotiation or consultation with the users but via official administrative channels, which has caused some disputes especially in terms of licensing fees for background music played on business premises. MCSC uses a lump-sum calculation method for licensing fees based on the space area of the business premise where the background music is played on the ground that playing background music is considered a mechanical performance. Users regard this method for calculation problematic because there is no detailed list of which musical works are played on a specific occasion. Moreover, disputes can also arise between MCSC and users regarding the standard of licensing fees per unit area of a business space.
On 1st December 2008, over 200 restaurants and hotels protested what they perceived to be 'vague licensing fees' by refusing to play background music during their business hours at their business premises. MCSC took a very tough stance in the dispute, insisting that it would never compromise or capitulate to the protest. This silent protest triggered a wave of discussion about MCSC's legitimacy to collect licensing fees for background music, and its fairness in setting a specific charging standard without any consultations with users. The discussion was partly settled by a court decision supporting MCSC, with the 200 restaurants and hotels resuming playing background music after over 20 days' silence (Yang, 2008) .
Almost at the same time, MCSC initiated a case to court against Merry Mart, a supermarket in Beijing, for copyright infringement by playing collectively managed music without paying licensing fees. The court reached its decision later in early 2009, also supporting MCSC's appeal. 41 This case confirmed MCSC's right to collect licensing fees for background music. However, criticism continued in terms of the process of setting specific standards.
CAVCA published the Charging Standard for Copyright license to Karaoke Operation Industries to illustrate its basis and methods used for the collection of licensing fees. This charging standard, RMB 8-10/terminal/day (see Appendix 2), 42 is based on NCA's Notice No. 1 (2006) 43 and varies with the economic development of different areas of China. CAVCA's charging standard was quite controversial when it was published. Some users and associations, e.g., the Guangzhou Association of Culture and Recreation, expressed concerns about the unreasonably high prices been set, and refused to pay licensing fees (Xing, 2007) . It has been reported that by the end of 2009, there were over 100, 000 karaoke operators in China, of whom only 1% submitted licensing fees (Lai, 2010) . That was the reason for CAVCA initiating massive lawsuits to collect licensing fees (Zhang and Wan, 2008) . CAVCA generally take the 'initiate a lawsuit to facilitate fees collection' strategy, which entails CAVCA initiating a lawsuit against a major karaoke operator in a certain area, obtaining a definitive decision from the court, and collecting licensing fees as the court decision is enforced. In some places, such lawsuits are supported 100% by the court (Zhang, 2014) . However, this strategy is effective in result but costly in process. Given that China is a country with a large population and territory, and that karaoke is a very popular form of entertainment, such a strategy is not efficient owing to the high cost of fee collection and litigation. By January 2010, CAVCA has entrusted a private corporation (Tianhe) 44 to establish branches in 30 provinces in China in order to collect licensing fees. It also initiated over 160 administrative complaints and over 800 civil litigations against users refusing submitting licensing fees to encounter obstacles in the fee collection process .
Imbalanced distribution of collected licensing fees
In 2010, the second General Assembly of Members of CAVCA approved the Distribution Scheme for Copyright Licensing Fees of Karaoke Television. According to this plan, 8% of licensing fees is to be deducted for the national Sunshine Project for Regulatory Platform of Content Management Service System on karaoke in recreation area (sunshine project) 45 after tax (Tan, 2010) . The remaining licensing fees CAVCA collected are divided as follows: 50% thereof is distributed to CAVCA (27%) and Tianhe (23%), another 50% is distributed between right holders where recording companies received 30% and lyricists and composers received 20% (Zheng, 2010) . 46 Since the 20% revenues for lyricists and composers are first collected by CAVCA, then transferred to MCSC, and further distributed to lyricists and composers, this revenue transfer mechanism makes it impossible for lyricists and composers to challenge the initial distribution plan made by CAVCA. In CAVCA's Charter, it is only stipulated that the distribution of collected licensing fees shall be based on the methods approved by the General Assembly of Members, with no requirement to publicise these methods or the exact distribution structure. Somewhat problematically, composers and lyricists themselves are not members of CAVCA, so they do not get the right to challenge the distribution plan. Current circumstances being what they are, even if they did, it would not be easy to mobilise all these independent individuals to claim their rights and access to information.
Not only lyricists and composers, right holders in general have not been satisfied with this imbalance in the distribution of collected licensing fees (Zhang, 2014) , which has caused them and users to question to the not-for-profit characteristics of CAVCA. As a response, CAVCA asserted that as long as recording companies agree with the aforementioned distribution, others have no rights to challenge it (Lai, 2010) . Such position of CAVCA further compounded the tension between it and right holders.
Obstacles and risks for CMOs in litigation
As mentioned before, the legitimacy of CAVCA and MCSC to collect licensing fees is based on Copyright Law and Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004); specific standards are also indicated on the NCA's official website. This legitimacy also supports CAVCA in initiating litigation when confronting a refusal of payment. Indeed, CAVCA is very adept at using a strategy of 'initiate a lawsuit to facilitate fees collection'. As mentioned, in some places, such lawsuits are supported 100% by the court (Zhang, 2014) . In practice, however, CAVCA and MCSC often encounter obstacles during the litigation process.
First is the challenge of classifying CAVCA or MCSC as the plaintiff in the litigation. Main issues behind are whether or not a right holder has authorised MCSC or CAVCA to represent them in order to collect licensing fees on their behalf, and whether or not MCSC and CAVCA are able to participate in the litigation process. Article 24 of Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) requires CMOs to establish an information system for right holders and users, including information regarding the type(s) of collectively managed right, names of the audio-video products or musical works, names of right holders and terms of authorisation, etc. However, as this information system is provided unilaterally by CMOs themselves, it does not hold legal weight as copyright registration. Moreover, Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) do not stipulate that the initial search result from the information system can be considered evidence as to whether or not a CMO is authorised by a right holder. Therefore, the existence of this information system on its own is not convincing enough in litigation, and CAVCA or MCSC are often challenged by the defendants in terms of their authenticity of authorisation to act on behalf of a specific right holder . 47 The second obstacle is proof of legitimate authorisation from right holders, mainly caused by loopholes in the authorisation process. For instance, according to the sample Copyright Authorisation Contract of Audio Video Products provided by CAVCA, right holders shall register their audio-video products via an Audio-video Products Registration Form provided by CAVCA, and inform them in written form of any changes after the contract is signed. These registration documents are the basis for the authorisation and distribution of subsequent licensing fees. 48 However, in practice, over 200 right holders authorised almost 100,000 audio video products in a lump-sum way. Given that a large number of authorisations potentially coming from the same right holder, individual registration forms are sometimes not properly filled out, which has brought about further challenges to CAVCA's legal classification as the plaintiff in arbitration or litigation procedures. Another loophole is that, during litigation, CAVCA always undertakes the burden of proof that the audio video products involved in a case are identical to those under authorisation to their collective management. CAVCA is able to do this by providing authorisation contract, which requires right holders to deposit a copy of each audio-video product under authorisation. The problem is that such deposits are occasionally missing, placing CAVCA in an awkward position of being unable to prove this connection. Recently, this problem has been solved by the pool for copyrighted karaoke tracks, which has been previously discussed.
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The third risk during litigation is the potential claim from a third party involved in the collectively managed rights, caused by a lack of due diligence investigation by CAVCA and MCSC. Chances exist that CAVCA or MCSC may register a product to a third party who is not the authentic right holder. With the year-on-year significant increase in members, it is becoming more difficult for CMOs to undertake their due diligence investigation. Another type of disputes caused by the lack of due diligence is the lump-sum licensing on musical works of collectively managed members' rights and rights of non-members. Once these musical works or audio video products from non-members are licensed, MCSC or CAVCA risk involving themselves in lawsuits initiated by non-member authentic right holders for copyright infringement, or by licensees for the breach of a contract.
Last challenge is to prove rights on musical works or audio video products by foreigners and stateless persons recognised in reciprocal agreements signed by CAVCA or MCSC with CMOs of other countries. Reciprocal agreements can only prove that members of overseas CMOs have authorised CAVCA or MCSC to manage their rights, but not the existence and legitimacy of such rights per se. Once been involved in litigation, the process of proving these rights to be legitimate can be very complicated.
According to Article 11 of Several Provisions of Supreme People's Court on Evidence of Civil Procedures,
50 the credibility of overseas rights ownership can be recognised by court in China after it is first recognised by a public notary in the host country and then certified by the Chinese embassy or consulate in that country; alternatively, this credibility can also be recognised after performing the relevant proceedings provided by agreements between China and the host country. This is a costly and time consuming process for foreign right holders, so the initial challenge often remains.
Possible solutions to current challenges
In the short history of China's copyright collective management, MCSC and CAVCA have been pioneers for other CMOs. The problems that they have faced since their inception, as identified in the last two sections, are also typical for other CMOs that share some similarities, especially in terms of their monopolistic and quasi-official status, schemes for the collection and distribution of licensing fees as well as challenges in litigations. This section discusses some possible solutions to the problems MCSC and CAVCA confronted with, which will also be illuminating to other CMOs in similar situations.
Addressing overlaps and gaps in CMOs jurisdiction
To help resolve the problem of potential double charging caused by management overlaps, the aforementioned prior consultation mechanism in Article 26 of Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) should be made a compulsory procedure. Moreover, users facing double charging should have the access to proper remedies, for example, a right to appeal to the NCA or to initiate a legal lawsuit.
The problem of management gaps, especially the gap created by the non-existence of a CMO on related rights of performers and broadcasting organisations, could be mitigated by amendments in Copyright Law and related administrative regulations. For example, if Copyright Law were to stipulate that 1 CAVCA should accept the membership of performers or broadcasting organisations if they are interested parties to the authorised rights on audio-radio products 2 no matter whether performers or broadcasting organisations are members of CAVCA or not, they are entitled to obtain a certain proportion of licensing fees.
The procedure and evidence related issues in civil litigations have been noticed and addressed by CAVCA and MCSC. 51 
Regulation of CMOs' monopolistic status
Chinese CMOs' monopolistic status per se is not a problem, as long as power vested in this monopoly is not abused. Given that the Anti-monopoly Law (2007) in China 52 is very conservative in terms of intellectual property issues, 53 we recommend specific measures to regulate the potentials for CMOs to abuse their monopolistic status.
Firstly, the exclusive authorisation that CMOs obtain from right holders should not exclude right holders themselves from protecting their own right by initiating a lawsuit or arbitration. While the right to appeal by right holders has been confirmed by a reply of the Supreme People's Court, it is denied by Article 20 of Regulations on Copyright Collective Management (2004) . 54 This inconsistency in legal provisions should further be clarified so that cases initiated by right holders are accepted by the court, and CMOs ability to sue to restrict such rights should be rejected.
Secondly, CMOs charging standards should be set after consultation with users. In response to massive litigations initiated by CAVCA and MCSC, users argued that they did not disagree with paying the fees, but were discontented with the charging standard. In order to relieve the tense relationship between CAVCA, MCSC and their users, we recommend that prior negotiation or consultation with their users should be compulsory, and provide proper legal remedies that users can resort to if necessary.
Finally, we recommend that CMOs should abide by the Anti-Monopoly Law (2007) of China and not undertake activities it prohibited, such as restrictions on the exit of members or discriminate members, or refusing to transact with certain users. As long as the Anti-monopoly Law (2007) is properly enforced, there will be effective checks and balance to regulate monopolistic power of CMOs.
Proper uses of CMOs' quasi-official status
In the early stage, the quasi-official status of CMOs in China facilitated their development owning to the support of NCA. However, with the development of CMOs, this quasi-official status has caused several problems as discussed in Section 3.3. It can be argued that this advantage should have been prudently used to facilitate market transactions and improve efficiency of CMOs because they cannot be both regulators and market players. We generally agree with Lu (2007) which argues ultimately such status of CMOs in China should be completely changed, and CMOs should, ideally, become private entities. Considering the advantages that CMOs' current legal status affords them, this paper suggests that the NCA should abstain from participating in the decision making of CMOs, and current CMOs gradually transit into privately held market entities. 55 First of all, NCA's intervention in the operation of CMOs should be substantially restrained. Regardless of whether CMOs are private or public entities, a certain degree of autonomy is conducive for them to manage their costs and better serve the interests of right holders. For instance, CMOs' operation scope could be decided based on market demands instead of the administrative regulations of the NCA. Moreover, specific operational issues such as standards for charging licensing fees could also be better nudged after adequate negotiation with the other party, instead of being circulated in the form of an NCA notice.
Furthermore, with more independency, CMOs can be organised and managed more like profit-oriented private/market entities. In China, the not-for-profit nature of CMOs is determined by law, and CMOs are thus not sensitive to operation costs. As a result, Chinese CMOs' management fees can often be very high compared with those of CMOs in other countries. The profitable nature of foreign CMOs is not necessarily in conflict with the core mission of a CMO, as long as anti-monopoly laws are effective and certain degree of competition is introduced. In addition, if CMOs in China are profit oriented, they will be more sensitive to operation costs and be more incentivised to improve their services. As private/market entities, CMOs in China would also consider themselves equal to their users and right holders in the market, instead of regulators. This would greatly serve to ease the current tension between CMOs and users in the negotiation of licensing fees, and also that between CMOs and right holders in the distribution of collected fees.
More transparent governance of CMOs
Concerns relating to a lack of transparency in the governance of CMOs are not unique to China. It is the key challenge addressed by the newly introduced EU Directive 2014/26/EU on the Collective Management of Copyright and Related rights (EU Directive 2014/26/EU). 56 As stated in the previous section, management fees for karaoke (27% of total revenue for CAVCA and 23% for Tianhe, after tax and the sunshine project fee) are very high compared with those in other countries, which undermines the credibility of CAVCA to its members, users and other stakeholders. 57 There is an urgent need for CMOs in China to make their practices more transparent to maintain their credibility. The first step is to guarantee the right to information of right holders. 58 CAVCA has already published on its website a pool of tracks it is authorised, as well as its organisational structure and membership terms. In order to aid greater transparency, the following information should also be provided regularly referring to the EU practice in the aforementioned Directive: financial statements, a report overview of all activities of the financial year, legal information on any entities directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the CMO, and so forth.
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The second step would be to enhance transparency in financial management. Even though such disclosure has been required by law, CAVCA has not yet published a single open audit report to the public. 60 EU Directive 2014/26/EU aims to improve transparent governance of CMOs in the EU, with the requirement that they have 'a supervisory function for continuously monitoring the activities and the performance of the duties of the persons who manage the business of the organisation'. It further requires the supervisory body to report to the general assembly of members at least annually. 61 To CMOs themselves, a mandate stated in this Directive relating to transparency is to release an annual transparency report. 62 Taking lessons from this EU Directive, 63 CMOs in China should also make public their annual financial reports, not only to the regulating authorities, right holders and users, but also to the public in general. It would also be of benefit if their financial audit was conducted by an external party or an agency appointed by user representatives, instead of being conducted in-house by CMOs themselves, as this would give it greater credibility in the eyes of the public. 64 Chinese laws and regulations should also provide judicial remedies instead of administrative complaints for right holders and users when CMOs fail to provide. 65 Last but not least, the issue of protection of works by foreigners and stateless persons could be solved by amending the legislation or judicial interpretation to recognise preliminary evidence relating to foreign right holders, in order to meet the needs of increased international cooperation in the form of reciprocal agreements between Chinese CMOs and their counterparts from other countries.
Conclusions
In a country with a long cultural tradition but only a very short period in which copyright has been understood and protected, MSCS and CAVCA have made great contributions to the protection of copyright in China. As they are the dominant CMOs and pioneers among other CMOs in China, discussion on problems and challenges in their practice in this paper is conducive for a better understanding of the other CMOs. The advantages of quasi-official monopolistic status of CMOs in China shall be prudently maintained by CMOs and also be properly regulated by relevant authorities so as to enhance transactions in market and improve efficiency of CMOs. In particular, to enable their ongoing development and better services for right holders and users, it is imperative to restrict the power of the NCA to be involved in CMOs' decision making, better regulate CMOs under the Anti-monopoly Law (2007), and gradually transform CMOs into market entities. Finally, measures to improve transparency should also be adopted by Chinese CMOs to protect rights of right holders and users and control financial irregularities.
broadcasting time of the audio product over the total duration of the program (if the proportion is lower than 1%, the fees are calculated as 0.02%).
Licensing fees for the transmission of audio-video products via information networks are distinguished between downloading ringtones for mobile phones and trial listening, and downloading musical works from the Internet, as follows:
• For downloading ringtones for mobile phones, the licensing fee is 14% of the total download fee; the minimum fee for each download of a musical work is RMB 0.14, with RMB 200 being pre-paid annually as a deposit.
• For trial listening (and) downloading musical works from the Internet, licensing fees are RMB 200 basic fee plus commission fees for each musical work annually. The commission fee is 5% of the advertisement revenue solely for the trial listening service, and 5% of advertisement revenue plus 10% of the download fee for trial listening and downloading.
